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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
The state appeals from the district court's pre-trial ruling that the 
prosecution was prohibited from using the preliminary hearing testimony of a 
deceased witness at trial. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The state filed a complaint charging Kyle A. Richardson with three counts 
of delivery of methamphetamine. (R., pp. 24-25.) The matter proceeded to 
preliminary hearing. (R., pp. 46-48.) One of the witnesses called at the 
preliminary hearing was Robert Bauer. (P.H Tr., p. 57, Ls. 7-15. 1) Bauer was a 
confidential informant for the Lewiston Police Department. (P.H. Tr., p. 58, Ls. 
19-22.) Bauer testified that he purchased methamphetamine three times from 
Richardson. (P.H. Tr., p. 59, Ls. 13-24.) Richardson's counsel cross-examined 
Bauer. (P.H. Tr., p. 63, L. 8 - p. 74, L. 15.) The magistrate bound Richardson 
over, and the state filed an information. (R., pp. 48-50, 52.) 
Prior to trial the state filed a motion to use Bauer's preliminary hearing 
testimony because Bauer had died. (R., pp. 73-74, 135-38.) Richardson 
objected, claiming that Bauer's name had not been revealed in discovery prior to . 
the preliminary hearing and, because he did not learn Bauer's name earlier, he 
did not have adequate opportunity for cross-examination. (R., pp. 100-04.) The 
district court agreed and sustained the objection. (R., pp. 148-52.) The state 
1 The preliminary hearing transcript has been included in the record as an exhibit. 
It is cited herein as uP.H. Tr." 
1 
obtained permission to appeal. (R., pp. 156, 159, 163-65; Order Granting Motion 
for Permissive Appeal (12/28/12).) 
2 
ISSUE 
Did the district court commit reversible error when it concluded 
nondisclosure of the confidential informant's name prior the preliminary hearing 
denied Richardson the opportunity for effective cross-examination where 




The District Court Erred Because Richardson Failed To Show That He Was 
Denied The Opportunity For Effective Cross-Examination 
A. Introduction 
The district court concluded that because the state had not disclosed 
Bauer's name in discovery (referring to him only as a confidential informant) 
Richardson did not have an opportunity to cross-examine him at the preliminary 
hearing. (R., pp. 148-52.) Because the record clearly establishes that 
Richardson did have the opportunity to cross-examine Bauer at the preliminary 
hearing, the district court's conclusion is reversible error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
An appellate court exercises free review of whether admission of prior 
testimony violates the right to confrontation. State v. Mantz, 148 Idaho 303, 305, 
222 P.3d 471, 473 (Ct. App. 2009). 
C. The District Court Erroneously Excluded Bauer's Prior Testimony 
A criminal defendant has the right to confront the witnesses against him 
under the Sixth Amendment. The right to confront hearsay evidence is met 
where the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for 
cross-examination. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). "The 
ability to question adverse witnesses, however, does not include the power to 
require the pretrial disclosure of any and all information that might be useful in 
contradicting unfavorable testimony." Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 53 
(1987). Three factors to consider in determining whether a defendant had a prior 
4 
opportunity for cross-examination are whether the defendant was represented by 
counsel, whether there were any limitations on cross-examination, and whether 
there exists a new and significantly material line of cross-examination that was 
not previously touched upon. Mantz, 148 Idaho at 306-07, 222 P.3d at 474-75 
(citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 57; Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972); 
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970); and Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 
(1965)).2 
In this case Richardson did not contest the first two of these three factors, 
as the record clearly established he was represented by counsel and there were 
no limitations imposed upon cross-examination by the magistrate judge 
conducting the preliminary hearing. (See P.H. Tr., p. 63, L. 8 - p. 74, L. 17.) 
Richardson's claim that he was unable to adequately prepare (R., pp. 100-04; 
Tr., p. 8, L. 17 - p. 13, L. 25) should thus be analyzed under the third prong: 
whether the lack of disclosure caused a significantly material line of cross-
examination to go untouched-upon. 
The record shows there was no material line of cross-examination that 
that was not addressed in the preliminary hearing because Bauer's name was 
not disclosed before that hearing. Lines of cross-examination pursued at the 
preliminary hearing included: Bauer's drug addiction (P.H. Tr., p. 63, L. 23 - p. 
64, L. 1); that Bauer was working off criminal charges by being a confidential 
informant (P.H. Tr., p. 64, Ls. 2-24); his drug use on or about the days in 
2 I.C. § 9-336 (admissibility of preliminary hearing testimony at trial) and I.R.E. 
804(b)(1) (prior testimony hearsay exception) do not impose additional 
requirements on admissibility. Mantz, 148 Idaho at 307-08,222 P.3d at 475-76. 
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question (P.H. Tr., p. 65, L. 11 - p. 66, L. 12; p. 67, L. 25 - p. 68, L. 10; p. 69, L. 
14 - p. 70, L. 9); his ability to recollect the events at issue (P.H. Tr., p. 66, L. 13-
p. 69, L. 13; p. 71, L. 18 - p. 74, L. 15); whether he was in treatment for his 
addiction (P.H. Tr., p. 70, Ls. 10-14); his record for felony convictions (P.H. Tr., p. 
70, L. 15 - p. 71, L. 4); and his history of selling methamphetamine to 
Richardson (P.H. Tr., p. 71, Ls. 5-17). The lines of examination Richardson 
claimed were inadequately explored were Bauer's "drug use and criminal 
history." (R., p. 103.) These lines of cross-examination were, however, 
thoroughly explored. (P.H. Tr., p. 65, L. 11 - p. 66, L. 12; p. 67, L. 25 - p. 68, L. 
10; p. 69, L. 14 - p. 70, L. 9; p. 70, L. 15 - p. 71, L. 4.) In fact, Richardson's 
investigation into Bauer's criminal history merely confirmed Bauer's testimony. 
(Compare P.H. Tr., p. 70, L. 15 - p. 71, L. 4 (Bauer's testimony that he had one 
felony conviction for possession of methamphetamine) with R., pp. 107-33 
(showing one felony conviction for possession of methamphetamine).) The 
record establishes no '''new and significantly material line of cross-examination 
that was not at least touched upon in the [preliminary hearing].'" Mantz, 148 
Idaho at 307, 222 P.3d at 475 (quoting Mancusi, 408 U.S. at 215). 
The district court concluded that the defense was "placed in a position of 
using cross-examination at the preliminary hearing as an investigatory tooL" (R., 
p. 151.) The district court cites no authority and articulates no logic for 
concluding an opportunity to conduct "investigatory" cross-examination is not an 
opportunity to conduct cross-examination. To the contrary, the opportunity to 
cross-examination does not encapSUlate "the pretrial disclosure of any and all 
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information that might be useful in contradicting unfavorable testimony." Ritchie, 
480 U.S. at 53. Moreover, whether defense counsel knew the answers to the 
questions he asked before he asked them is logically irrelevant. Either way, 
counsel fully explored Bauer's drug use and relevant criminal history. That 
counsel's subsequent investigation revealed no evidence not already addressed 
and exposed in cross-examination demonstrates the illogic of the district court's 
reasoning. 
Even if the court's legal reasoning were not erroneous, it is based on a 
clearly erroneous factual finding. The district court stated that whether 
Richardson in fact knew Bauer was the confidential informant was "speculative in 
nature." (R., p. 151.) The only evidence in the record, however, is that 
Richardson knew Bauer was the confidential informant. Bauer testified that he 
and Richardson had known each other for twenty years. (P.H. Tr., p. 57, L. 19-
p. 58, L. 4.) After he was charged, Richardson went to Bauer's house to talk 
about the charges and Bauer admitted that he was the confidential informant. 
(P.H. Tr., p. 62, Ls. 12-25.) When Bauer admitted being the confidential 
informant Richardson "didn't seem real surprised." (P.H. Tr., p. 63, Ls. 1-4.) 
Richardson never denied knowing Bauer was the confidential informant and 
presented no evidence refuting Bauer's testimony about their relationship and 
prior revelation he was the confidential informant. (R., pp. 100-04; Tr., p. 8, L. 17 
- p. 13, L. 25.) Because the only evidence before the district court was that 
Richardson in fact knew Bauer was the confidential informant, the district court's 
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conclusion that it was only speculative that Richardson knew is clearly 
erroneous.3 
The applicable law is that preliminary hearing testimony is admissible at 
trial where the witness is unavailable and the defendant was afforded the 
opportunity to cross-examine. A denial of the opportunity to cross-examine is 
shown where there is denial of counsel, cross-examination was limited, or 
(relevant here) there is a new and significantly material line of cross-examination 
that was not previously touched upon. The record shows no such new line of 
cross-examination in this case. To the contrary. the lines of cross-examination 
suggested by Richardson were in fact addressed extensively at the preliminary 
hearing. Thus, the district court erred by concluding Bauer's preliminary hearing 
testimony was inadmissible. 
3 Even accepting the district court's conclusion that Richardson's knowledge was 
"speculative," the court erred. If it is only "speculative" on the record whether 
Richardson in fact knew the identity of the confidential informant the record fails 
to disclose any reason the opportunity for cross-examination would be 
inadequate. In short, after concluding that whether Richardson knew Bauer was 
the confidential informant before the preliminary hearing was "speculative," the 
court then proceeded on the assumption that Richardson in fact did not know, 
and therefore based its whole analysis on a fact it had just concluded was mere 
speculation. (R, p. 151.) 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court's 
order excluding the preliminary hearing testimony of Robert Bauer. 
DATED this 9th day of July, 2013. 
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